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Three research efforts are presented which develop new signal processing tech-
niques as applied to the Global Positioning System. These three efforts are de-
scribed in chapters that constitute stand-alone research papers. The first pa-
per describes a software-defined radio that processes GPS signals, as well as a
custom-built hardware platform that the software runs on. This receiver imple-
ments several novel processing techniques and was the result of collaborative
work between The University of Texas at Austin, ASTRA, and Cornell Univer-
sity. The second paper discusses anomalies in the carrier phase of a particular
GPS satellite discovered using the aforementioned software receiver. The final
paper discusses a real-time implementation of a GPS spoofing detection method
created as an addition to the software receiver, with detection results from a lab-
oratory spoofing attack.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Use of radionavigation satellite systems such as the U.S. Global Position-
ing System has become ubiquitous for its intended purposes of navigation and
timing. The fact that the signals from these systems traverse the atmosphere
en route to terrestrial users has made them an invaluable remote sensing tool
for the study of the troposphere and ionosphere. Commercial receivers are of-
ten inadequate for the unique requirements of atmospheric scientists because
the receivers either do not produce appropriate measurements or the manner
in which the measurements are produced are unknown to the users due to the
generally proprietary nature of commercial products.
In the interest of producing a GPS receiver uniquely suited to ionospheric
study, a software-defined receiver was built: the Connected Autonomous Space
Environment Sensor (CASES). This receiver was designed to be inexpensive,
easy to modify via software changes, and capable of producing measurements
both useful to and understandable by ionospheric scientists. The design and
features of this receiver, both the software and the custom-designed hardware
upon which it runs are described in detail in Chapter 2.
In the course of using this receiver to study variations in Total Electron Con-
tent (TEC), it was discovered that the phase of the carrier signal from one par-
ticular satellite was behaving in a manner not described by the civilian GPS
interface specification [1]. Specifically, the carrier was exhibiting aperiodic step
changes on the order of 10 degrees. These newly discovered phase anomalies
are discussed in Chapter 3.
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The open nature of civilian GPS signals makes those signals vulnerable to
spoofing [2, 3, 4, 5], the transmission of signals intended to appear as legitimate
GPS signals for the purpose of deceiving users of those signals. One defense
against GPS signal spoofing involves making use of the unknown but presum-
ably secure (and thus un-spoofable) P(Y) code [6, 7, 8]. To demonstrate this
method in real-time, the aforementioned software-defined GPS receiver CASES
was modified to implement this method. The details of this implementation
and experimental results therefrom are described in Chapter 4.
2
CHAPTER 2
CASES: A SMART, COMPACT GPS SOFTWARE RECEIVER FOR SPACE
WEATHER MONITORING
B.W. OHanlon, M.L. Psiaki, S. Powell, J.A. Bhatti, T.E. Humphreys, G. Crowley,
Geoff and G. Bust. “CASES: A smart, compact GPS software receiver for space
weather monitoring,” Proceedings of the ION GNSS Meeting, 2011.
2.1 Abstract
A real-time software-defined GPS receiver for the L1 C/A and L2C codes has
been developed as a low-cost space weather instrument for monitoring iono-
spheric scintillation and total electron content. The so-called CASES receiver im-
plements several novel signal processing techniques not previously published
that make it well suited for space weather monitoring: (A) a differencing tech-
nique for eliminating local clock effects, (B) an advanced triggering mechanism
for determining the onset of scintillation, (C) data buffering to permit obser-
vation of the prelude to scintillation, and (D) data-bit prediction and wipe-off
for robust tracking. The receiver has been tested in a variety of benign and
adverse signal conditions (e.g., severe ionospheric scintillation, both real and
simulated); the results are presented here. The custom hardware platform on
which the software runs is compact while remaining flexible and extensible.
The CASES platform consists of a digital signal processor, an ARM microcon-
troller, and a custom-built narrow-band dual-frequency front end. Because the
receiver is software-defined, it can be remotely reprogrammed via the Internet
3
or another communications link.
2.2 Introduction
CASES (Connected Autonomous Space Environment Sensor) was designed to
facilitate ionospheric study. Study of the Earth’s ionosphere is a particularly
difficult proposition due to its location, spanning from one hundred kilome-
ters or so to greater than one thousand kilometers above the Earths surface.
As the signals from GPS satellites traverse this region and are changed by dis-
turbances therein, they provide a unique tool for studying the structure of the
ionosphere and its variations. GPS signals are changed in two ways of particular
interest: refraction due to the presence of charged particles in the ray path, and
diffraction due to the occasionally irregular densities of those charged particles.
The path-integrated number of electrons (total electron content, or TEC) can be
observed by comparing observations on multiple frequencies. The effects of
density irregularities manifest as rapid fluctuations of signal amplitude and/or
phase (ionospheric amplitude and phase scintillation, respectively). GPS re-
ceivers have been used to study both of these effects for many years [9]. The
CASES receiver differs from typical GNSS receivers in two key ways: it has been
specially designed to measure TEC and scintillation parameters, and special fea-
tures have been implemented that allow it to operate robustly in the presence of
vigorous ionospheric scintillation. The estimation of TEC will be lightly treated
here, as scintillation provides a much more challenging signal environment than
any observed TEC fluctuations, and the measurements needed to estimate TEC
are produced in the course of standard receiver operation (i.e., code and car-
rier phase measurements). Signal variations due to tropospheric effects are not
4
addressed here.
Section 2.3 of this paper contains a description of the CASES hardware plat-
form, the available peripherals, and the performance specifications. Section 2.4
describes the various novel processing techniques implemented by the receiver.
Section 2.5 contains an analysis of the receiver performance under various sig-
nal conditions, and Section 2.6 contains conclusions about the platform. CASES
is the result of development effort between Cornell University, the University
of Texas at Austin, and ASTRA [10, 11].
2.3 Hardware Platform
The CASES receiver was designed with the goal of providing a capable plat-
form with many peripheral options while remaining inexpensive, relatively
small, and power-efficient. The final configuration has three main components:
a custom-built dual-frequency front end, a digital signal processor board, and
a “single board computer” (SBC) featuring an ARM microcontroller. A block
diagram of the receiver hardware is shown in Fig. 2.1, and a photograph of the
receiver in two different configurations is shown in Fig. 2.2.
The front-end performs automatic gain-controlled amplification, filtering,
mixing to intermediate frequency, and sampling. The front-end has a rela-
tively narrow bandwidth of 2.4 MHz, and produces 2-bit samples at 5.7 MSam-
ples/second. As it is a dual-frequency front-end, it produces one set of 2-bit
samples for each of the GPS L1 and L2 frequencies. An on-board temperature-
compensated crystal oscillator (TCXO) is the frequency reference for both fre-
quencies, and both signals are sampled synchronously. Although the use of
5
Figure 2.1: Receiver hardware block diagram.
a TCXO introduces non-negligible variations in measured carrier phase [12], a
method to remove this error has been implemented, as discussed in Section 2.4.
The front-end can provide a selectable 5 volt DC bias on the antenna input for
powering active antennas, and has an optional input for connecting an exter-
nal 10 MHz frequency reference, with termination of 50 or 1000 Ohms. The
board consumes approximately 360 milliamps at 5 volts, excluding any power
required by a connected active antenna.
CASES is a software-defined receiver, with all processing downstream of the
front end performed on a general-purpose digital signal processor. A second
custom-designed board houses a Texas Instruments C6457 digital signal pro-
cessor (DSP). The processor runs at a 1 GHz clock speed, has 2 MB of on-chip
RAM, 128 MB of off-chip RAM, and 4MB of non-volatile flash memory. The
so-called DSP board performs all acquisition and tracking functions, as well as
6
Figure 2.2: CASES in two different form factors.
computation of the navigation solution and various observables such as pseu-
dorange, beat carrier phase, and Doppler shift. The board outputs in-phase and
quadrature accumulations, beat carrier phase, and timestamps at up to 100 Hz,
and all other data at 10 Hz or less. Processor utilization while tracking 12 GPS
L1 C/A code channels and 4 GPS L2CL channels as well as computing the nav-
igation solution, performing continuous background signal acquisition, and all
other overhead is roughly 75%. The DSP board consumes approximately 580
milliamps at 5 volts.
The third main receiver component is an SBC running the GNU/Linux oper-
ating system. The SBC features an ARM AT91SAM9260 microcontroller with a
host of available peripherals. This board features 32 MB of RAM and 128 MB of
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flash memory for the file system. Available peripherals include Ethernet, serial
peripheral interface, a secure digital card reader, universal serial bus, ZigBee,
Wi-Fi, a 10-bit analog-to-digital converter, and general-purpose I/O pins. Com-
munication is typically done via RS232 serial port, Ethernet, or Wi-Fi. The SBC
runs a network-connected server program that allows remote monitoring, data
logging, and uploading of new code images or configuration files. Additionally,
it runs a secure shell server to allow remote log-in for additional operations not
provided by the server program. The SBC consumes approximately 260 mil-
liamps at 5 volts.
2.4 Novel Signal Processing Techniques
Density irregularities in ionospheric plasma can induce rapid fluctuations in
the phase and/or amplitude of GPS signals, which can cause the receiver to
lose signal lock [9, 13]. This problem is even more pronounced for GPS L2P(Y)
signals in receivers that employ codeless or semi-codeless tracking techniques,
which are more prone to losing lock on the signal due to various losses in-
troduced by the processing [14], and are not well suited for measuring phase
scintillation on L2 due to the low tracking loop bandwidth they typically em-
ploy [13]. A quantitative relationship between scintillation effects on multiple
frequencies is not well understood, though it has long been known that the
correlation between multiple frequencies is inversely related to the scintilla-
tion intensity (see Fig. 1 of [15]). Thus, a dual-frequency receiver is desirable
both for estimating TEC and for estimating ionospheric scintillation parameters
at disparate frequencies, as multiple-frequency scintillation parameter estima-
tion provides non-redundant information. Several techniques have been imple-
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mented to make this receiver particularly well suited for scintillation monitor-
ing.
2.4.1 Removal of local clock effects
Ionospheric scintillation severity is typically characterized by two parameters:
S4, the normalized signal amplitude standard deviation, and σφ, the carrier
phase standard deviation [16]. Unfortunately, the phase noise introduced by
a receiver’s TCXO (such as the one used in CASES) is spectrally similar to the
phase fluctuations from ionospheric scintillation (see Fig. 2 in [12]). To pre-
vent local clock variations from contaminating estimated scintillation param-
eters, the CASES receiver pre-processes the carrier phase time histories to re-
move common-mode clock effects, prior to estimating the scintillation parame-
ters. The key idea in this algorithm is that the TCXO-induced phase noise can be
estimated by observing phase fluctuations from a signal that is known to be free
of ionosphere-induced phase variations [17]. Just how one knows that a signal
is free of these fluctuations prior to the calculation of scintillation parameters
whose validity depends on this assumption is a bit of a chicken-and-egg conun-
drum, but it is readily resolvable, as described in subsection 2.4.2 below. For
now, let us assume that a suitable reference signal free of ionospheric scintilla-
tion has been identified. The clock effect removal algorithm starts by modeling
the beat carrier phase measurements from the nth tracking channel as
φn = φn−geom + φclk + φn−scint + nn (2.1)
where φn−geom is the phase component due to satellite geometry, φclk is the phase
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component due to oscillator noise, φn−scint is the phase component due to iono-
spheric effects, and nn is other noise sources (e.g., thermal noise, satellite oscilla-
tor phase noise, multipath). Assume that a reference channel free of ionospheric
effects has been identified. The phase of the reference channel is modeled as
φref = φref−geom + φclk + nref (2.2)
where the same notation applies as previously, but for the reference channel
rather than the nth tracking channel. The difference of these carrier phases is
taken, creating a combined carrier phase measurement given by
φ˜n = φn − φref
= φn−geom − φref−geom + φn−scint + nn + nref (2.3)
This new phase measurement now contains the combination of the geometric
effects for the two channels, the combination of the noise on the two channels,
and the phase fluctuations due to scintillation on channel n.
In the next processing step, the differential phase due to geometric effects
∆geom ≡ φn−geom − φref−geom is removed. Over time intervals of up to 100 sec-
onds, and for stationary GPS receivers, ∆geom can be accurately modeled as
a 3rd order polynomial. It can then be removed by subtracting the 3rd order
polynomial fit of ∆geom over a 100 second interval from the combined carrier
phase measurement. This procedure removes the ∆geom component while leav-
ing φn−scint unaffected at the frequencies of interest (greater than about 0.2 Hz).
The resulting phase after removal of differential geometry terms is modeled as
10
φ˜nf = φn−scint + nn − nref (2.4)
Thus, the phase scintillation on channel n is isolated from local clock and satel-
lite motion effects. It should be noted, however, that φ˜nf is a filtered version of
the phase scintillation effects on channel n. Given that vigorous phase scintil-
lation often contains substantial power well beyond the bandwidth of a typical
phase tracking loop (e.g., beyond 10 Hz) [17], high-frequency scintillation ef-
fects are not present in φ˜nf . To recover the high-frequency variations induced
by scintillation – up to the pre-detection bandwidth Bpd = 1/Ta, where Ta is
the correlation accumulation interval – the instantaneous phase angle of the in-
phase and quadrature accumulations φIQn = atan2(Qn · d, In · d) is added to
φ˜nf
φ˜npd = φ˜nf + φIQn (2.5)
Here, d is the ±1 valued navigation data bit that was in effect over the interval
corresponding to In and Qn. The quantity φ˜npd includes all scintillation frequen-
cies up to the pre-detection bandwidth. For typical Ta = 0.02s, Bpd = 50Hz,
which is sufficient to capture even vigorous phase scintillation.
Alternatively, the complex channel response function [18] z(t) can be produced
simply by rotating the vector defined by the In and Qn accumulation values by
the phase φ˜nf .
The penalty paid for adding φIQn to φ˜nf is, of course, that φIQn includes high-
frequency noise in addition to possible high-frequency scintillation. Despite
this, φ˜npd is a useful new quantity for study of phase scintillation because it is
11
Figure 2.3: De-trended beat carrier phase for two satellites.
free of local clock, satellite geometry, and phase tracking loop effects.
To illustrate the effectiveness of phase pre-processing techniques, consider Figs.
2.3 and 2.4. Fig. 2.3 shows data gathered by the author during a scintillation
campaign at the Jicamarca Radio Observatory near Lima, Peru, in March of
2011. The red signal was the reference channel, and the blue signal (barely visi-
ble underneath the red trace) was strongly scintillating.
What is shown is simply the beat carrier phase of the two signals after fitting
and removal of a 3rd order polynomial to eliminate geometric effects. The two
lines are virtually indistinguishable, indicating that the majority of variation is
due to clock effects. Fig. 2.4 shows the carrier phase (in green) of this same
scintillating signal, after removal of local clock effects and de-trending of the
12
Figure 2.4: Amplitude and phase scintillation of a GPS signal.
phase measurement. The signal amplitude is shown in blue. This plot shows
four easily recognizable “canonical fades” [18] (the abrupt half-cycle or nearly
half-cycle phase shifts coincident with deep amplitude fades at approximately
320, 340, 380, and 500 seconds) as well as one severe amplitude fade that is not
coincident with an abrupt half-cycle phase shift (at approximately 360 seconds).
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2.4.2 An advanced triggering mechanism for determining the
onset of scintillation
Due to the high data rates involved when logging data for scintillation study, it
is desirable to have a reliable indicator for when signals are experiencing scin-
tillation to avoid recording large amounts of uninteresting data. To put this
in perspective, suppose a single “scintillation record” (e.g., amplitude, phase,
and time stamp) takes 24 bytes to store. Recording these data for 24 individu-
als channels at 100 Hz requires about 5 GB per day. Processing this amount of
data is prohibitive and even simply storing it quickly becomes onerous. His-
torically, receivers have used the aforementioned S4 or σφ as triggering mecha-
nisms: when one of these parameters exceeds some preset threshold, high rate
data logging is begun. However, from a modeling standpoint it is desirable to
have a single parameter that triggers the logging rather than some combination
of two parameters. Further, σφ has been shown to be an unreliable indicator
of scintillation intensity [19, 20]. These requirements led to the development of
a spectrum-based triggering mechanism; this accounts for both amplitude and
phase fluctuations, and a single triggering statistic can be computed by con-
sidering the ratio of power in a particular band to the total amount of power
measured. This metric has been termed the “scintillation power ratio,” or SPR.
It should be noted that as this statistic includes the 100 Hz amplitude and phase
data, the bandwidth is determined by the pre-detection bandwidth rather than
the PLL bandwidth.
To compute the scintillation power ratio, the following steps are taken, using
a 100 second window of data:
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1. Remove local clock effects from carrier phase measurements and detrend,
as in section 2.4.1, above.
2. Rotate the vector defined by the in-phase and quadrature accumulations
by the phase from step 1. This results in a complex time history of the
signal, with variations due only to ionospheric effects and noise terms.
3. Apply a windowing function (CASES uses a Hann window).
4. Take the FFT of the result.
5. Compute the ratio of the power in a particular frequency band to the total
power in the accumulation bandwidth.
Figure 2.5: Power spectrum of the complex channel response functions of a
scintillating signal. Frequency bands used for the scintillation power ratio are
shown in orange.
The frequency band used for triggering is set to ±(0.2 − 8) Hz, though the
user can change this. A power ratio in excess of -20 dB is taken to indicate
a signal is experiencing scintillation. Fig. 2.5 shows the complex channel re-
sponse function power spectral density (i.e., the result produced after step 4 of
the above algorithm) for a GPS signal that was experiencing scintillation. There
is a large DC component to this signal due to the direct component of the chan-
nel response function [20]. The frequency bands used in the SPR calculation are
highlighted in this figure. These bands as well as the power ratio threshold were
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chosen by examining a large amount of actual equatorial scintillation data, as
well as existing literature that has performed similar examinations [12, 16, 18].
Preliminary results from using CASES have shown that these frequency bands
are also appropriate for studying high-latitude scintillation.
An elevation mask is used to exclude satellites below a particular elevation
from the calculation in order to minimize contributions from multipath errors.
The frequency band used in the SPR calculation can be set by the user to any
value using a configuration file. Similarly, the user can select a different window
length, triggering threshold, elevation mask angle, and frequency resolution for
the FFT.
As promised, the issue of reference channel selection (as described in Sec.
2.4.1) will now be revisited. To locate a channel that is free of ionospheric effects,
the SPR is calculated using every possible pair of channels that are tracking the
same signal type (e.g, GPS L1 C/A) with one of the channels acting as refer-
ence. The pair of channels that produce the lowest SPR (and has an SPR below
some much more stringent threshold than the threshold used for triggering) are
both declared reference channels. The SPR for this pair of channels is re-checked
each time SPR is calculated to make sure it remains below the reference power
threshold. If it exceeds that threshold, it is assumed that one or both of the ref-
erence channels are scintillating, and a new set of reference channels is searched
for. If all channels are scintillating or if all channels except one are scintillating,
then this technique for removal of clock effects will not work.
16
2.4.3 Data Buffering
As discussed in subsection 2.4.2 above, triggering of high rate data logging is
used to effectively filter out “uninteresting” data, and minimize storage and
processing requirements. This triggering method operates on batches of data
100 seconds in length for CASES, but window lengths of 60 seconds are common
[17]. The result of this is that by the time high-rate logging is triggered, some
time has elapsed since the onset of scintillation, and in the worst case an entire
window period has passed. As this receiver was designed to advance the study
of scintillation (among other goals), it seems prudent to provide the greatest
amount of data from these events as is possible. Further, studying the onset of
these events may prove critical to understanding the underlying atmospheric
dynamics. With that in mind, a buffering scheme was implemented whereby
data from all satellites is stored in a circular buffer (i.e., first in, first out) for
220 seconds. If a scintillation event is detected, the receiver outputs the data in
the buffer for the scintillating signal. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.6. The data in
Fig. 2.6 are actual (mild) amplitude scintillation gathered by the author during
a campaign in March, 2011 in Lima, Peru. Suppose the triggering mechanism
used the window indicated by the highlighted region for detection. In most
receivers, if the indicated amplitude fade caused the detection statistic to trigger
high-rate logging, it would not begin until the end of the window (as data from
the entire window are used in calculating the statistic). In so doing, potentially
valuable data are thrown away. By buffering data, CASES is able to log from the
beginning of the plot, two minutes prior to the event that indicated scintillation
was occurring.
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Figure 2.6: Illustration of the benefits of data buffering.
2.4.4 Data Bit Prediction
Scintillation-induced phase variations are particularly troublesome for the car-
rier tracking loops of GPS receivers, and present as a variety of phenomena
including cycle-slipping and frequency unlock [13]. For a receiver designed to
study scintillation effects, it behooves the designer to make the receiver as re-
silient to these effects as possible. GPS receivers generally operate with Costas-
type PLL discriminators due to the modulation of the signal by the unknown 50
Hz data bit stream. This induces a loss of loop SNR known as squaring loss [21].
Carrier tracking performance can be improved with judicious choices for the
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pre-detection interval, the loop bandwidth, and the loop discriminator [20].
CASES employs a 3rd order PLL with a decision-directed arctangent discrim-
inator, a 7.5 Hz loop bandwidth, and a 10 millisecond pre-detection interval.
If the data bits are known a priori, a full-cycle (i.e., non-squaring) type PLL
can be used, further improving tracking. This is particularly effective when in
the presence of scintillation due to the aforementioned canonical fades that oc-
cur during scintillation, which manifest as half-cycle phase jumps. If the data
bits are known, these phase jumps can be rightly measured as scintillation-
induced variations rather than part of the signal. In the case of GPS, the
12.5 minute navigation message conveyed by the data bits changes quite in-
frequently (on even-numbered hours when the ephemeris data are updated or
roughly daily in the case of almanac data). CASES records a library of observed
data bits when the carrier-to-noise ratio is above a preset threshold, then uses
these recorded data bits in the PLL if the carrier-to-noise ratio drops below that
threshold (a possible indicator of scintillation). This data bit library also re-
computes the time of week and parity data as required (as these are continually
changing in a known manner), and monitors for possible ephemeris or almanac
data updates. Results from testing the efficacy of the data-bit prediction algo-
rithm are presented in Section 2.5. Note that there are small windows of time
when the data bit library is unavailable, namely after an ephemeris or almanac
data update, though the library makes it known that the bits are unavailable
until the new data are recorded.
The L2 civil long signal is used when tracking on the GPS L2 frequency as
this signal has no data bit modulation. Therefore, it is more robust to scintilla-
tion for the same reasons as given above.
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2.5 Receiver Performance Analysis
The receiver has been run using both real and simulated1 data in an effort both
to confirm the operational advantages provided by the novel algorithms de-
scribed herein, and to get a measure of the precision with which it can produce
the standard observables such as phase and pseudorange.
2.5.1 Measurement Precision
The precision with which pseudorange can be measured is of particular impor-
tance as this impacts the accuracy of TEC estimates made using those measure-
ments. The errors in carrier phase measurements are typically two orders of
magnitude smaller than those for pseudorange [21].
To estimate the precision with which CASES can measure pseudorange, two
receivers were connected to the same antenna, and TEC was computed using
both pseudorange and carrier phase (for an entire satellite pass, about 5 hours).
Fig. 2.7 illustrates this, with the pseudorange-derived value shown in blue, and
carrier-phase-derived value shown in red.
The results for the two receivers are shown in the bottom two panels, while
the difference of the results is shown in the top panel. The errors in the top panel
are due only to receiver thermal noise and RF front-end differential filter delay
effects. Local oscillator effects are removed by creating the differences shown in
the bottom two panels as these errors are common to the measurements on L1
and L2. Multipath effects are eliminated in the inter-receiver difference as the
1Simulated RF data was generated by a Spirent GPS signal simulator, and contained signal
scintillation as described by the model in Ref. [22].
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Figure 2.7: Single-receiver dual frequency ionospheric delay at L1 (bottom
two panels) and inter-receiver ionospheric delay difference (top panel). Code-
derived values are in blue and carrier-phase-derived values are in red. The
receivers used a common antenna, and the carrier-phase-derived data have had
a bias relative to the code-derived data removed.
two receivers shared an antenna. The increased noise at either end of the plot
relative to the middle is due to lowerC/N0 and thus greater measurement noise.
The minimum RMS noise in the top panel is 0.5 meters, which implies an RMS
error for a single receiver of about 0.35 meters. This is the fundamental precision
with which CASES can measure pseudorange on L1. Since the L2 civilian signal
is weaker than the L1 C/A signal, and the receiver tracks only the civil long
code on the L2 frequency, the L2 pseudorange measurements will be slightly
worse than this.
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Multipath errors can contribute as much as 5 meters (RMS) to pseudorange
measurements [23]. The large multipath component is clearly shown in the bot-
tom two panels as greatly increased noise as compared to the top panel (note the
differing vertical scales). As CASES uses a narrow-bandwidth front-end, many
advanced multipath mitigation techniques are unsuitable. One approach that is
feasible is to tune the delay lock loop early-minus-late correlator spacing, which
can result in better multipath rejection at the cost of tracking precision [24]. Af-
ter testing, a value of 0.6 chips has been determined as optimal for the current
receiver, and a (carrier aided) delay lock loop bandwidth of 0.1 Hz is used. The
precision of CASES in the presence of multipath after tuning these parameters
is shown in Fig. 2.8.
Again, pseudorange is shown in blue, carrier phase in red. In this plot, the
two receivers (bottom two panels), are connected to different antennas. In this
test, Rx A was in a good multipath environment, while Rx B was in a poor mul-
tipath environment (note the differing vertical scales). The RMS pseudorange
error here for a single receiver (when the satellite was at high elevation) is 2.7
meters, but it should be noted that this is merely illustrating a typical value for
pseudorange errors in the presence of multipath; the particular antenna used
and the multipath environment are all significant factors here and any particu-
lar case could differ significantly.
2.5.2 Scintillation Robustness
Testing of the data bit prediction algorithm has shown that CASES is highly
resistant to half-cycle phase jumps while experiencing ionospheric scintillation.
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Figure 2.8: Single-receiver dual frequency ionospheric delay at L1 (bottom
two panels) and inter-receiver ionospheric delay difference (top panel). Code-
derived values are in blue and carrier-phase-derived values are in red. The
receivers used independent antennas.
To conduct this test a scintillation scenario was generated using the Cornell Scin-
tillation Model [22] on a Spirent GSS7700 GPS Signal Simulator. The simulation
parameters were: nominal C/N0 = 43 dB-Hz, S4 = 0.8, t0 = 0.8 s. The resultant
signal was then tracked using CASES, and the measured phase history was sub-
tracted from the true phase history recorded by the signal simulator. The CASES
tracking was done in a post-processing mode after recording the data from the
Spirent to ensure that exactly the same data were used for the comparison. The
results of this test are shown in Figs. 2.9 and 2.10
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Figure 2.9: Phase error without use of data bit prediction.
The diagonal trend of the line sections is due to clock rate differences be-
tween the simulator and the receiver, and it should be noted that the vertical
scales of the graphs differ in order to show as much detail as possible on each.
Fig. 2.9 shows 16 half- or full-cycle slips. Fig. 2.10 shows only a single full cycle
slip over the same period, thus it performs much better.
It should also be noted that while using the data bit prediction algorithm,
only full cycle slips occur rather than half cycle slips, which are generally easier
to remove in post-processing.
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Figure 2.10: Phase error with data bit prediction.
2.5.3 Comparison With a Commercial Scintillation Monitor
CASES receivers were validated during a field campaign at the Jicamarca Ra-
dio Observatory near Lima, Peru in March, 2011. Six receivers were deployed
in a small-baseline ( 1 km) array with the intent of observing scintillation and
validating the ability of the receiver to operate while experiencing severe scin-
tillation. Some observations recorded during this campaign have already been
shown in Figs. 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6. One additional scintillation event is shown
in Figs. 2.11 and 2.12. In Fig. 2.11, amplitude data from both CASES and a
commercial scintillation monitor are shown in the top panel, with CASES in
blue and the commercial receiver in red. Additionally, the bottom panel shows
reported L1 C/A lock time for the commercial receiver. This plot illustrates
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that the commercial receiver lost lock several times during the severe ampli-
tude fades while CASES retained signal lock. S4 during this period exceeded
0.9. A zoomed-in look at this plot between 700 − 770 seconds is shown in Fig.
2.12. These plots show that CASES is capable of tracking through even quite
vigorous scintillation.
Figure 2.11: Amplitude scintillation observed by CASES and a commercial scin-
tillation monitor.
2.6 Conclusions
A software-defined dual-frequency GPS receiver has been designed for use as
a space weather monitoring instrument. This software has been embedded in
a flexible and capable hardware platform that allows remote monitoring, data
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Figure 2.12: Detail of amplitude scintillation observed by CASES and a com-
mercial scintillation monitor.
logging, and reconfiguration. This receiver implements several novel software
processing techniques that allow it to excel at monitoring space weather due to
an advanced triggering technique, special data buffering, removal of local clock
effects, and a data bit prediction algorithm that makes it particularly robust to
ionospheric scintillation. This platform has been tested both in the field and
the laboratory and shown to have marked advantages versus receivers lacking
these features.
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CHAPTER 3
GPS SATELLITE ANOMALIES
B. W. O’Hanlon, “Carrier-Phase Anomalies Detected on SVN-48”, GPS World
via http://gpsworld.com/carrier-phase-anomalies-detected-on-svn-48/, May,
2010.
3.1 Introduction
Anomalous behavior of the L1 C/A code carrier phase has been detected on
PRN 07/SVN 48. The anomalies are sudden step-like changes of phase by about
10deg/5mm. These steps are followed by negative steps of the same magnitude
that restore the original phase time history. These anomalous square pulses
have been observed with durations as short as 0.1 sec and as long as 600 seconds.
They can occur about once a minute or be absent for hours.
This behavior was detected when testing a dual-frequency software receiver
that processes the GPS civilian signals on L1 and L2. One use of this receiver
is for making measurements of total electron content, or TEC. TEC, in so-called
TEC units (1 TEC unit = 1016 electrons / m2) is computed as
TEC = (φL1λL1 − φL2λL2) f
2
L1f
2
L2
40.3 (f 2L1 − f 2L2)
− bTEC (3.1)
where φL1 and φL2 are the beat carrier phase measurements of the signal re-
ceived on the L1 and L2 frequencies, respectively, fL1 and fL2 are the L1 and L2
frequencies, respectively, the λ terms are the corresponding wavelengths, and
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bTEC is a bias term that occurs in the phase-based calculation and is unimportant
here. The anomaly was first noted when calculating carrier-phase-based TEC,
as the generally large but common-mode effects on carrier phase due to relative
motion between the satellite and receiver are eliminated in the TEC calculation,
allowing easy observation of this much more subtle effect.
3.2 Observations
A plot of the resulting TEC, after removal of its mean value, is shown in Fig. 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Square pulses on phase-based TEC due to L1 C/A carrier phase
anomalies.
This figure shows 6 square-edged pulses that range in duration from 0.1 sec
to 590 sec, with the first being a short one at t = 48 sec. The last pulse starts at t =
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710 sec and ends at t = 1300 sec. In all cases, the anomaly consists of an apparent
positive step change in TEC followed some time later by a negative step change
of identical magnitude. Step magnitudes in the range 0.04 to 0.07 TEC Units
have been observed.
Tests were performed in order to ascertain whether the anomalies were
caused by the L1 signal, the L2 signal, or a combination of the two. Additional
tests ruled out receiver malfunction as the cause of the anomalies.
Observation of detrended L1 and L2 carrier phase time histories quickly re-
vealed that the anomalies occur on the L1 carrier phase. The detrended L1 C/A
carrier phase shows square-edged pulses that corresponded to the times, mag-
nitudes, and signs of the TEC anomalies, but the detrended L2C carrier phase
plots show no such pulses. A typical detrended (negative) L1 C/A beat carrier
phase anomaly is shown in Fig. 2, plotted in range-equivalent meters.
Extensive tests were performed in order to check whether the anomalies may
have been caused by the receiver. The anomalies were initially discovered us-
ing a digital storage receiver of raw RF front-end samples followed by off-line
software receiver processing. Such carrier phase anomalies could result from
signal glitches in the RF front-end’s mixing chain, from data recording anoma-
lies in the RF front-end samples, or from errors in the software receiver code.
The former two possibilities were ruled out by two means. One was to process
signals from other satellites for the same RF samples. Mixing problems or data
sample problems would cause similar anomalies on all GPS signals, but other
GPS signals were found to be free of anomalies. Additional tests used simul-
taneous data collection by two digital storage receivers that were spaced 700
meters apart. The two devices also used different RF front-end hardware. Both
30
Figure 3.2: A typical anomaly as observed in the (negative) range-equivalent L1
C/A carrier phase .
receivers showed identical anomalies at identical times.
Software receiver code errors were ruled out by employing two indepen-
dent sets of receiver processing code, one developed in MATLAB and the other
in C. These two pieces of software were developed independently by differ-
ent individuals and were run independently by their developers. They both
showed identical anomalies. A final check used a completely different receiver,
the commercially available Novatel GSV4004B. Figure 2 plots its detrended L1
C/A carrier phase is along with that of the C-based Cornell software receiver.
They both show the same anomaly. Thus, they appear to be caused by the SVN
48 transmitter.
All of these observations have been made from roof-mounted antennas in
Ithaca, N.Y. The anomalies were first observed on March 24, 2010, and were
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observed again on April 1, 5, 7, and 29th. They have been observed as late as
May 13. There was one period of several hours on May 11 when no anomalies
occurred. The following additional Block IIR-M satellites have also been moni-
tored briefly, but without finding any similar anomalies to date: SVN 58/PRN
12, SVN 55/PRN 15, SVN 57/PRN 29, SVN 49/PRN 01, and SVN 50/PRN 05.
3.3 Conclusion
These anomalies could be of consequence for some GNSS applications. For pre-
cise monitoring of differential TEC, the magnitude of this anomaly is the same
order as the signals of interest. Precise Point Positioning (PPP) systems seek to
achieve CDGPS accuracy without direct double differencing. The lack of double
differencing would allow any L1 C/A carrier phase anomaly to directly affect
the PPP solution.
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CHAPTER 4
REAL-TIME GPS SPOOFING DETECTION VIA CORRELATION OF
ENCRYPTED SIGNALS
B.W O’Hanlon, M.L. Psiaki, J.A. Bhatti, D.P. Shepard, and T.E. Humphreys,
“Real-Time GPS Spoofing Detection via Correlation of Encrypted Signals,”
NAVIGATION, Journal of the Institute of Navigation, vol. 60, no. 4, pp267-278,
2013.
4.1 Abstract
A method for detecting the spoofing of civilian GPS signals has been imple-
mented and successfully tested in a real-time system. GPS signal spoofing is
an attack method whereby a third party transmits a signal that appears authen-
tic but induces the receiver under attack to compute an erroneous navigation
solution, time, or both. The detection system described herein provides a de-
fense against such attacks. It makes use of correlations between the unknown
encrypted GPS L1 P(Y) code signals from two narrow-band civilian receivers to
verify the presence or absence of spoofing. One of these receivers is assumed
to be at a secure location that is not subject to spoofing. The other receiver is
the potential spoofing victim for which the present developments constitute a
defense. Successful detection results are presented using a reference receiver in
Ithaca, New York, a victim receiver in Austin, Texas, and a spoofer in Austin,
Texas.
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4.2 Introduction
GPS spoofing is a method of attacking a Global Positioning System receiver
with the goal of having the targeted receiver compute an erroneous navigation
solution, an incorrect time, or both [3, 4, 5]. Spoofing of the unencrypted civil-
ian L1 C/A signal has been demonstrated both in the laboratory [4, 5] and in
the field [25]. Although there have, as yet, been no confirmed GPS spoofing
attacks observed “in the wild,” the vulnerability of GPS to spoofing attacks has
long been a concern [3, 2, 26], and an Iranian engineer claimed to have used
GPS spoofing to capture a highly classified U.S. drone in December, 2011 [27].
Proposed methods for detecting spoofing attacks include examining changes to
certain signal characteristics [28], incorporation of external hardware such as an
inertial measurement unit [29], use of multiple [30] or moving receiver anten-
nas [31], or cryptographic techniques [32, 33, 34, 8, 35, 36].
This work is an extension of the work presented in Ref. [33] and presents an
implementation of the cryptographic technique of Refs. [32, 33, 34, 8] that oper-
ates in real-time. A major contribution of this work is that it is the first real-time
implementation of a cryptographic civilian GPS spoofing detection technique.
Tests of this system against a sophisticated spoofer constitute another significant
contribution.
This spoofing detection technique makes use of the encrypted P(Y) code and
assumes that it cannot be spoofed. Given that the U.S. military has implemented
and guards this encryption, this is a reasonable assumption, with two caveats:
this technique does not detect “meaconing” [36] attacks, or attacks that attempt
to estimate and replay the P(Y) encryption code. The former attack is fairly
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limited in scope, and there are other defenses [36] against the latter attack, thus
this defense still has significant value.
Given the assumed security of the P(Y) code, an attacker spoofing the civil-
ian C/A code will be unable to provide spoofed P(Y) code that has the correct
encryption chips. The two receivers in this spoofing detection system know the
expected relationship between the C/A code and the P(Y) code. They both track
the C/A code and isolate the component of the signal that should be a noisy ver-
sion of the P(Y) code. A communication link is used to send one of these signal
components to the other receiver, which then correlates the two versions to pro-
duce a spoofing detection statistic. In this implementation, the raw unprocessed
samples from one receiver front-end are transmitted to the other receiver (which
then does all of the aforementioned processing), as this is more efficient when
more than one satellite is being tracked.
A large value of the spoofing detection statistic indicates identical true P(Y)
code in both receivers, which indicates that the potential victim receiver (the
“defended receiver”) is not being spoofed. A near-zero value of this statistic, on
the other hand, indicates the absence of P(Y) code in one or both receivers, pre-
sumably just in the victim receiver. This low value indicates a spoofing attack.
Of course, P(Y) code could be missing from the other receiver (the “reference
receiver”), but this system assumes the reference receiver has been made im-
pervious to spoofing. The choice of a detection threshold against which this
statistic is compared is addressed with a hypothesis testing analysis. The hy-
pothesis testing analysis used here is an adaptation of the one developed in
Ref. [8]. Adaptation has been necessitated by simplifications in the test statistic
calculation which facilitate real-time operation. The simplified statistic calcula-
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tion and hypothesis test analysis constitute another contribution of this paper.
In the course of testing this algorithm, it has been necessary to perform an
experimental calibration of the difference in transmitted power between the L1
C/A and P(Y) code signals. A nominal value is suggested in the GPS Interface
Specification [37], but experimental results have shown that it differs slightly
from the published value, and the value differs somewhat between satellites.
These variations have been previously observed [38, 39], but the current satellite
constellation differs significantly from its state at the time of that work. Another
contribution of this paper is a table with the experimentally-derived transmis-
sion power differences for each satellite.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section dis-
cusses the experimental set-up and the hardware used for receiving and pro-
cessing the data. The second section reviews the signal model and necessary
pre-processing and introduces two new loss factors that are required for cor-
rect estimation of the P(Y) signal power. Next, the algorithm for computing
the spoofing test statistic and other quantities required for the hypothesis test
is described. Results from testing this system under a spoofing attack are then
presented. Also included in the results section is a table with the measured
per-satellite difference in L1 P(Y) code vs. C/A code signal power. The paper
concludes with a discussion and summary of its important points.
4.3 Architecture
The spoofing detection system consists of two narrow-band radio front-ends
and data capture systems, a full GPS software radio system with additional
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spoofing detection software running on a personal computer, and a method
for transporting the data from the two front-ends to the software radio com-
puter. Although the radio front-end/data capture systems are not stand-alone
GPS receivers, they will nonetheless be referred to as “receivers” in the interest
of brevity.
Both receivers perform mixing, filtering, and sampling of the radio-
frequency signal, producing 2-bit samples at a sample rate of 5.7 MHz. The
intermediate frequency filters in the two front-ends each have a nominal 3-dB
bandwidth of 2.5 MHz. This narrow bandwidth attenuates the wide-band P(Y)
signal by 5.5 dB and distorts it. The exact filter response for each receiver has
been characterised using off-line system identification techniques [40]. Knowl-
edge of this response is important for the correct design of a spoofing detection
hypothesis test that properly accounts for the P(Y) signal attenuation and dis-
tortion.
The data from each receiver are either directly recorded to a hard drive, or
streamed over a network connection and then recorded to a hard drive, depend-
ing on the particular equipment set-up. The software receiver and spoofing de-
tection calculations operate on the data that is stored to disk. It can operate in
a real-time mode or an after-the-fact mode. It would be possible to replace the
disk storage with a buffer in RAM.
To reduce the possibility of a man-in-the-middle type attack where the data
transmitted over the network are intercepted by a third party and replaced with
other (possibly spoofed) data, a secure shell (SSH) tunnel was used for all net-
work communication. This encrypts the data using triple DES encryption and
is believed to be secure [41].
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Software that carries out the spoofing detection calculations has been added
to an existing GPS software receiver [42]. This software processes the samples
from both front-ends in parallel. It tracks the civilian L1 C/A code signals,
performs P(Y) code cross-correlation, and produces a metric that indicates the
likelihood that the defended receiver is being spoofed. This software receiver
could be physically located anywhere; for this system it was co-located with the
reference receiver for convenience and the raw unprocessed samples from the
defended receiver were transmitted to it over the Internet. By transmitting the
unprocessed samples rather than the processed signal component for each indi-
vidual signal, the required communications bandwidth is reduced. The receiver
architecture used for this work is illustrated in Fig. 4.1. Except for the SSH tun-
nel and the fact that the software receiver simultaneously processes data from
two radio front-ends, everything to the left of the dashed vertical line represents
standard software radio hardware and code. Everything to the right of that line
represents new calculations needed for spoofing detection.
Front-end Software 
receiver
Base-band mixed data 
(quadrature channel) for 
every tracked signal
Trusted 
reference 
receiver
Front-end
Tracks C/A code, 
produces estimates of 
phase and Doppler
Receiver 
requiring 
detection of 
spoofing
SSH tunnel Base-band mixed data 
(quadrature channel) for 
every tracked signal
Spoofing 
test statistic∑
Standard 
software radio
Spoofing detection 
calculations
Figure 4.1: An example receiver architecture.
All processing for this work was done on a personal computer with a quad-
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core Intel i7 930 CPU. This implementation processes data at approximately 3
times faster than real-time (i.e., it processes 30 seconds of data in 10 seconds); up
to 30 satellites common to both receivers can be tracked simultaneously in real-
time. Standard hemispherical patch antennas were used at both the reference
and defended receivers.
4.4 Signal Model and Pre-Processing
The pre-processing and signal model used here are developed in Ref. [8]. For
convenience, the relevant subset of equations from Ref. [8] are reproduced in
this section.
4.4.1 Signal Model
The models of the signals at the outputs of the RF fronts ends of the two re-
ceivers take the form:
yAi =AcACf (tAi)D(tAi)cos[ωIF tAi + φA(tAi)]+
ApAPY f (tAi)D(tAi)sin[ωIF tAi + φA(tAi)] + nAi (4.1a)
yBi =AcBCf (tBi)D(tBi)cos[ωIF tBi + φB(tBi)]+
ApBPY f (tBi)D(tBi)sin[ωIF tBi + φB(tBi)] + nBi (4.1b)
where yAi is the sample output by the RF front-end of receiver A, the reference
receiver, at receiver A clock time tAi, and yBi is the output of receiver B, the
defended receiver, at receiver B clock time tBi.
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Cf (t) and PY f (t) are functions representing the C/A and P(Y) codes, respec-
tively, after attenuation and distortion by the RF front-end. The function D(t)
represents the 50 Hz navigation data bit modulation. AcA and AcB are the re-
ceived C/A code amplitudes for receivers A and B, and the corresponding P(Y)
code amplitudes are ApA and ApB.
The nominal intermediate frequency is ωIF , and φA(t) and φB(t) are the beat
carrier phase time histories of the signals at the two receivers. The time deriva-
tives of φA(t) and φB(t) equal the receiver carrier Doppler shifts.
The remaining terms, nAi and nBi, are the receiver noise terms, which are
assumed to be discrete-time Gaussian white-noise with statistics:
E(nAi) = 0, E(n
2
Ai) = σ
2
RFA, E(nAinAj) = 0 for all i 6= j (4.2a)
E(nBi) = 0, E(n
2
Bi) = σ
2
RFB, E(nBinBj) = 0 for all i 6= j (4.2b)
E(nAinBi) = 0 for all i, j (4.2c)
4.4.2 Tracking the C/A Signal
To process the C/A code, the signal from the front end is mixed with carrier
and code replicas and accumulated for some period. These accumulations are
then used in discriminators in a Delay-Lock-Loop (DLL) and a Phase-Lock-
Loop (PLL) for feedback-based tracking. The prompt in-phase and quadrature
40
accumulations for the kth accumulation interval are:
Ik =
ik+N−1∑
i=ik
yiC[(iδT − τk)(1 + ωˆDk/ωL1)]× cos(ωIF iδT + φˆk + ωˆDk(iδT − τk))
(4.3a)
Qk =
ik+N−1∑
i=ik
yiC[(iδT − τk)(1 + ωˆDk/ωL1)]× sin(ωIF iδT + φˆk + ωˆDk(iδT − τk))
(4.3b)
where δT is the nominal front-end sampling period, τk is the DLL-produced es-
timate of the start time of the first code period in the accumulation as measured
by the receiver clock, and the sample index ik is the first sample in that C/A
code period (i.e., the first sample such that ikδT ≥ τk). The number of sam-
ples in the accumulation is Nk, which can be approximated as N , a constant.
The function C[t] is the local replica of the PRN code without RF filter effects;
it takes on the values ±1. The PLL’s carrier Doppler shift estimate for the kth
code period is ωˆDk, and φˆk is the estimated beat carrier phase at the code period
start time τk. The subscripts A and B have been omitted here as the processing
is identical for both receivers.
The spoofing detection algorithm exploits the known phase-quadrature re-
lationship of the encrypted P(Y) code relative to the C/A code, as per Eq. 4.1. It
isolates the quadrature part of the signal with the help of the PLL and DLL out-
puts φˆ, ωˆDk, and τk. The C/A code accumulations in Eq. 4.3 are used to estimate
the carrier-to-noise ratios required by the hypothesis test.
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4.4.3 Received Signal Power
The received carrier-to-noise ratio of the P(Y) signals in the two receivers are im-
portant inputs to the spoofing detection calculations. These quantities can be in-
ferred based on measured C/A code carrier-to-noise ratios coupled with knowl-
edge of receiver properties and calibrated relationships between the transmitted
C/A code power and P(Y) code power for the various GPS satellites.
The inputs to the C/A carrier-to-noise calculation are time histories of the
Ik and Qk prompt accumulations. These values can be used to estimate the
amplitude of the [Ik;Qk] vector and the variance of the Gaussian noise in each
individual Ik and Qk accumulation. These estimates are:
AIQ = (z¯
2 − σ2z)1/4 (4.4a)
σ2IQ = 0.5(z¯ −
√
z¯2 − σ2z) (4.4b)
where z¯ is the mean of the accumulation power and σ2z is its variance. These are
calculated from the raw accumulations as follows:
z¯ =
1
K
K∑
k=1
(I2k +Q
2
k)
∼= E{I2k +Q2k} (4.5a)
σ2z =
1
K
K∑
k=1
(I2k +Q
2
k)
2 − z¯2 ∼= E{[I2k +Q2k]2} − z¯2 (4.5b)
where K is the number of prompt accumulations included in these averages.
For this work, K = 1000 has been used with one millisecond accumulations.
These calculations can be used to estimate the effective variance of the noise in
the raw RF samples:
σ2RF =
2
N
σ2IQ (4.6)
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This notation differs somewhat from Ref. [8] because here the number of sam-
ples in each accumulation, N , is constant, whereas in that work it was allowed
to vary.
The C/A code carrier-to-noise ratio is computed using the quantities in Eq.
4.4 as:
(C/N0)c =
A2IQ
2σ2IQTaccum
(4.7)
where Taccum = δtN is the accumulation period.
The P(Y) code carrier-to-noise ratio can be computed from the C/A carrier-
to-noise ratio, but several loss factors must be taken into account. These loss
factors account for the effect of using un-filtered C/A code in Eq. 4.3 and the
effects of the front-end filtering on the C/A signal. Let the combined effect of
these two influences be denoted Lfca. The effect of the RF filter on the received
P(Y) signal produces the loss Lfpy. An additional loss factor, Lpsv, represents
the difference in transmitted power between the P(Y) and C/A signals. This
is nominally 3 dB, with P(Y) power lower than C/A power [37]. It has been
discovered to vary between satellites and to differ somewhat from the nomi-
nal value. A contribution of this work is the experimental calibration of this
previously unknown variation between satellites.
The P(Y) code carrier-to-noise ratio is:
(C/N0)py = LpsvLfpy
[
10−0.04/10(C/N0)c
Lfca
]
(4.8)
The method of calculating Lfpy, Lfca, and the power of 10 are explained in
Ref. [8]. The values for Lpsv are given in a table in Sec. 4.6. Excluding the
contribution of Lpsv, the factor Lfpy 10
−0.04/10
Lfca
has been computed to be −5.06 dB
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and −4.92 dB for the reference and defended receivers, respectively.
4.5 Methodology
This section explains the real-time implementation of the spoofing detection
technique presented in Refs. [32, 33, 34, 8]. Several of the modifications needed
for practical real-time implementation are non-trivial.
4.5.1 Spoofing Detection Statistic Calculation
To detect if the defended receiver is being spoofed, a spoofing detection statistic
as in Ref. [8] has been produced. To accomplish this, the part of the signal from
each receiver that is in quadrature with the C/A code is isolated, and the two
quadrature data streams from the two receivers are mixed together and accu-
mulated. Doing this requires knowledge of the carrier Doppler shift ωˆD, carrier
phase φˆ, and code start time estimate τ for each signal from both receivers. It
also requires the data from both receivers to have been aligned in time, i.e., a
given pair of mixed quadrature samples from the two receivers must have the
same time of transmission.
To accomplish time alignment, the software first performs a coarse synchro-
nization by locating the beginning of the same C/A code period in the data from
the two receivers for each signal. This is done by decoding the transmitted data
bits from each receiver to calculate the GPS time of week which indicates the
transmission time of a particular code period [37]. Each channel then processes
however many C/A code periods worth of data are required such that at the
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end of this process the reference and defended receiver channels are all process-
ing the C/A code period corresponding to the same nominal transmit time (as
this is a software receiver, “channel” in this context means the code that handles
the signal from a particular satellite). In general this requires a small amount
of waiting for the desired data to become available, depending on how closely
synchronized the data gathering is at the two receivers, on the receiver-satellite
geometry, and on network latency. The delay is generally a small fraction of a
second, so the process can still be considered “real-time.”
After this coarse synchronization, the reference and defended receiver chan-
nels each process a single C/A code period, followed by a P(Y) code cross-
correlation for the same period. To perform this cross-correlation, the quadra-
ture part of the signal from each channel must be isolated, and a set of samples
from the reference receiver must be somehow matched to a set of samples from
the defended receiver. This sample matching is, in effect, a fine time alignment
between the two receivers that attempts to match samples as closely as possi-
ble by the time of transmission of the underlying waveform. As the receiver
is tracking the phase of the L1 C/A signal with a PLL in the normal course of
operation, the correct carrier phase φˆ and frequency ωˆD required for quadrature
mixing are known.
The code start time estimate τ is also known for each receiver, but these
times do not directly indicate the optimal matching of samples between the two
receivers for cross-correlation. To determine the correct sample matching be-
tween the two receivers it is necessary to consider the effects of relative mo-
tion between the satellites and those receivers as it affects their relative Doppler
shifts. In general, the carrier Doppler shifts of the signals from each receiver
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will differ. To produce a P(Y) code cross-correlation with maximum power, the
nominal alignment of data between the two receivers is selected such that the
midpoint of their C/A code periods are aligned. This causes the P(Y) codes to
be aligned as well.
It should be noted that in the software receiver implementation many vari-
ables are stored as fixed-point for purposes of processing efficiency. In particu-
lar, the code start time estimate τ is stored as an integer sample index ik plus a
fractional sample index ik−frac:
τ = δT
(
ik +
ik−frac
ST
)
(4.9)
where δT is the front-end sampling period. The variable ik−frac is always non-
negative (though it is stored as a signed quantity), and scaled by a factor ST such
that 1 sample has ST subdivisions. In general, a given C/A code period has
initial sample indices ikA and ikB for receivers A and B, respectively. It also has
fractional sample counts ikA−frac and ikB−frac. Also note that cross-correlation is
done on a single C/A code period at a time (a “sub-accumulation”), and these
sub-accumulations are summed over many code periods to produce the final
result.
In the simplest case, ikA−frac and ikB−frac are equal, and the carrier Doppler
shifts in the two receivers are identical. Sample index matching is simple in
this case: the quadrature sample with index ikA in receiver A is mixed with the
quadrature sample with index ikB from receiver B, sample ikA + 1 in receiver
A is mixed with sample ikB + 1 in receiver B, and so on. The general case of
non-equal ik−frac values and Doppler shifts requires more consideration.
In correcting for the signal Doppler shift, an “effective code start time” is
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calculated. This effective code start time indicates the sample time that is, con-
sidering the effect of Doppler shift, exactly one-half of a C/A code period away
from the midpoint of the accumulation interval. This correction manifests as a
correction to the fractional sample index ik−frac as follows. Given the number
of samples in the code-period accumulation, N , the nominal L1 frequency ωL1,
the signal Doppler shift frequency, ωˆD, the sample period δT , and the nominal
C/A code chipping rate Fc−nom, the correction to the fractional code start time
estimate is:
δik−frac = round
NδT
[
Fc−nom
(
1 + ωˆD
ωL1
)
− Fc−nom
]
ST
2Fc−nomδT
 = round [NωˆDST
2ωL1
]
(4.10)
ForNδT ≈ 1 millisecond and a stationary receiver, |δik−frac| << ST . This correc-
tion is subtracted from the current fractional code start time to give an effective
fractional code start time:
iˆk−frac = ik−frac − δik−frac (4.11)
Note that this new iˆk−frac could be negative. If iˆk−frac < 0, iˆk−frac is incre-
mented by ST and the effective integer sample index is iˆk = ik−1. If iˆk−frac > ST ,
iˆk−frac is decremented by ST and iˆk = ik + 1. Otherwise the effective integer
sample index is iˆk = ik. Equations 4.10 and 4.11 are applied to the data from
receivers A and B, producing iˆk−frac−A, iˆk−A, iˆk−frac−B, and iˆk−B.
Interpolation is required to yield the same or nearly the same transmission
times of the mixed P(Y) codes from the two receivers. Otherwise, a large loss of
correlation power will occur due to the high chipping rate of the P(Y) code (10.23
MHz). In Ref. [8] a linear interpolation of the samples from one receiver is per-
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formed such that the data from both receivers were at the same effective trans-
mission times. This type of interpolation is avoided to minimize real-time com-
puting requirements and a simple nearest neighbor interpolation is performed
instead. This interpolation has the effect of choosing the set of samples from
each receiver such that at the midpoint of the accumulation interval there is a
maximum transmission time offset of δT
2
between the C/A codes from the two
receivers. The effective code start times introduced in connection with Eqs. 4.10
and 4.11 are used to perform the sample matching needed for this interpolation.
To determine the first sample to use in sub-accumulation, the difference of
the two effective fractional code start times is taken:
∆iˆk−frac = iˆk−frac−A − iˆk−frac−B (4.12)
The index of the first sample for each sub-accumulation from each receiver
is then:
i˜k−A = iˆk−A + max
[
round
(
∆iˆk−frac
St
)
, 0
]
(4.13a)
i˜k−B = iˆk−B −min
[
round
(
∆iˆk−frac
St
)
, 0
]
(4.13b)
This nearest-neighbor interpolation may cause a loss in correlation power
due to residual P(Y) code mis-alignment between the two receivers. Another
contribution of this work is calculation of an additional loss factor that accounts
for any such reduction in cross-correlation power. This loss factor is denoted
Lpxc, and its value depends on the shape of the autocorrelation function of the
P(Y) code after it is filtered by the receivers’ front-ends. It also depends on the
magnitude of the code offset error during each sub-accumulation interval. This
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error for each sub-accumulation is
iˆerr =

∆iˆk−frac
ST
if |∆iˆk−frac| ≤ ST2
1− ∆iˆk−frac
ST
if ∆iˆk−frac > ST2
1 +
∆iˆk−frac
ST
if ∆iˆk−frac < −ST2
(4.14)
and is measured in units of samples.
To determine the shape of the filtered P(Y) autocorrelation function, the RF
front-end filter response function has been estimated using off-line system iden-
tification techniques as in Ref. [40]. Then, using this response and a simple trian-
gular model for the un-filtered P(Y) code autocorrelation function, the real part
of the filtered P(Y) code autocorrelation function has been calculated. Figure
4.2 plots both the original wide-band P(Y) code autocorrelation function (green
dash-dotted line) and the filtered P(Y) code autocorrelation function (solid blue
line).
In performing the cross-correlation required to detect the presence of spoof-
ing, the instantaneous cross-correlation power loss equals the value of the fil-
tered autocorrelation function of Fig. 4.2 evaluated at the offset between the
P(Y) codes from the two receivers. Consistent with Eq. 4.14, the maximum code
misalignment error is ±1
2
of a front-end sample. This equals ±0.895 P(Y) code
chips. These maximum offsets are shown in Fig. 4.2 as the vertical dashed red
lines. Therefore, the worst case power loss factor caused by nearest-neighbor in-
terpolation is 0.87 (−0.6 dB). This small loss justifies the decision to use nearest
neighbor interpolation in order to simplify the real-time signal processing.
If the spoofing detection statistic were calculated over a single C/A code
period, the correlation power loss would be calculated by evaluating the fil-
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Figure 4.2: Filtered P(Y) code normalized autocorrelation function.
tered autocorrelation function at the code alignment error value iˆerr. Because
the spoofing detection statistic is calculated by summing over many C/A code
periods, an alternate approach is used. The correlation power is computed for
each individual period, and the results averaged over the full accumulation pe-
riod of the detection statistic to produceLpxc. In this implementation, the filtered
autocorrelation function values are stored in a look-up table. This value Lpxc is
used as part of the spoofing detection hypothesis calculations in the following
subsection.
Once the correct sample index has been selected for the start of the sub-
accumulation interval, carrier mixing must be performed. Note that at this point
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in the processing, the receiver has already performed carrier mixing in order to
compute the C/A code in-phase and quadrature accumulations, Ik and Qk, as
per Eq. 4.3. If this data that had been previously mixed with the quadrature
carrier replica were buffered, no additional work would be necessary. The soft-
ware would select the portion of this carrier-mixed data that begins at sample
index i˜k from each receiver and use that in the cross-correlation. Rather than
buffer the data, in this implementation the carrier replica is again mixed with
the data, starting at the chosen index. This was a design decision made to allow
more flexibility in the prototype system.
Given the PLL’s carrier phase estimate φˆ, the start index of the sub-
accumulation period i˜k, and the carrier Doppler shift ωˆD, a quadrature carrier
replica is generated using a technique based on Ref. [43], and the quadrature
part of the signal is isolated. For the kth code period, the quadrature base-band
mixed signal is
yqi = yisin
[
ωIF ti + φˆk + ωˆDk (ti − τ)
]
for ti = δT [i˜k, ..., (i˜k +N − 1)] (4.15)
This quantity is produced for each receiver, after which the un-normalized
spoofing detection statistic is computed. This statistic is simply:
γu =
M−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
∆i=0
yqA(˜ik−A+∆i)yqB(˜ik−B+∆i) (4.16)
where M is the number of C/A code periods in the accumulation, and
yqA(˜ik−A+∆i) and yqB(˜ik−B+∆i) are the quadrature base-band data samples at sam-
ple index i˜k−A + ∆i and i˜k−B + ∆i from receivers A and B, respectively. This im-
plementation differs somewhat significantly from that in Ref. [8]. In that work,
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the in-phase and quadrature accumulations Ik and Qk were used to correct for
any PLL tracking errors. That work made the assumption that noise effects on
Ik and Qk were negligible, which for this work proved not to be the case. Pro-
ducing the detection statistic γu as prescribed in Ref. [8] led to a result with less
power than simple multiplication by the quadrature carrier replica.
The actual implementation of Eqs. 4.15 and 4.16 is slightly different than
the definitions of the quantities imply for reasons of computational efficiency.
The receivers use 2-bit quantization and bitwise parallel operations [44]. This
means that the data and the local carrier and code replicas are all quantized to
two bits, with one bit indicating the sign of element, and the other bit indicating
the magnitude. 32 consecutive elements are then stored in two 32-bit integers,
with all of the sign bits stored in one integer, and all the magnitude bits stored
in the other. This allows processing of 32 samples in parallel. Mixing of various
elements (e.g., mixing the carrier replica with the data) involves only shifts and
logical operations on the 32-bit integers. This approach has been exploited in
order to design an efficient algorithm for performing cross-correlation between
the two data streams.
First, each data stream is partially mixed with its respective carrier replica.
This partial carrier mixing does two things: it shifts the data so that the first bit
of the first 32-bit word in the accumulation interval corresponds to the desired
sample index i˜k−A (or i˜k−B), and it multiplies the sign bits of the carrier replica
with the sign bits of the data. The results of this operation from the two receivers
are then multiplied together. These multiplies are done via the exclusive-or
operation. The rest of the cross-correlation is done with a look-up table, with the
input being a 20-bit word composed of 4 bits of the multiplied carrier sign bits
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and data sign bits, 4 data magnitude bits from each receiver, and 4 carrier replica
magnitude bits from each receiver. The look-up table output is the integer that
results from the multiply-and-accumulate of the 4 samples from each receiver
and their respective carrier replicas. This result is accumulated for the desired
integration time (i.e., a total of M ∗N samples, from Eq. 4.16), and produces the
un-normalized spoofing detection statistic γu. For a good description of similar
bit-wise parallel software radio calculations, see Ref. [44].
Note that the bit-wise parallel sine and cosine replicas used in Eqns. 4.3 and
4.15 have amplitudes greater than one. The effect of these non-unit amplitudes
divide out of the final normalized spoofing detection statistic presented in the
next subsection.
4.5.2 Spoofing Detection Hypothesis Test
In addition to the un-normalized spoofing detection statistic γu, several other
quantities must be calculated in order to implement a precise hypothesis test.
Following directly from Ref. [8], two hypotheses are presented: H0, the hypoth-
esis that the receiver is free of spoofing, and H1, the hypothesis that the receiver
is being spoofed. The mean and variance of the spoofing detection statistic γu
under H1 are:
γ¯u|H1 = 0 (4.17)
σ2γu|H1 =
MN
4
σ2RFAσ
2
RFB [1 + 2δT (C/N0)pyA] (4.18)
The mean value under this hypothesis is zero because if the receiver is be-
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ing spoofed, the effective received P(Y) code power is zero, thus the cross-
correlation produces no power.
Under H0, the spoofing detection statistic mean and variance are:
γ¯u|H0 = MNσRFAσRFBδTLpxc
√
(C/N0)pyA(C/N0)pyB (4.19)
σ2γu|H0 =
MN
4
σ2RFAσ
2
RFB{1 + 2δT [(C/N0)pyA + (C/N0)pyB)]} (4.20)
where Lpxc is the cross-correlation loss factor introduced in the previous subsec-
tion.
These terms are then normalized by the standard deviation under the hy-
pothesis of spoofing, H1, resulting in these means and standard deviations:
γ¯norm|H1 = 0 (4.21)
σγnorm|H1 = 1 (4.22)
γ¯norm|H0 = 2δTLpxc
√
MN(C/N0)pyA(C/N0)pyB
1 + 2δT (C/N0)pyA
(4.23)
σγnorm|H0 =
√
1 + 2δT [(C/N0)pyA + (C/N0)pyB)]
1 + 2δT (C/N0)pyA
(4.24)
The same normalization must be applied to the spoofing detection statistic that
has been calculated from the quadrature samples:
γnorm =
γu
σRFAσRFB
√
MN
4
[1 + 2δT (C/N0)pyA]
(4.25)
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Assuming the probability density functions under the spoofed and un-
spoofed hypotheses, p(γnorm|H1) and p(γnorm|H0), are Gaussian [8], and given
a probability of false alarm αfa, a spoofing detection threshold γth can be com-
puted by solving the following equation:
αfa =
∫ γth
−∞
p(γnorm|H0)dγnorm
=
1√
2piσγnorm|H0
∫ γth
−∞
exp
[
−(γnorm − γ¯norm|H0)
2
2σ2γnorm|H0
]
dγnorm (4.26a)
In practice, this equation is solved off-line by assuming a zero-mean, unit-
variance distribution and choosing a small value of αfa (αfa = 0.0001 for all
results herein), and the result is embedded in the source code. During pro-
cessing, this result is then multiplied by σγnorm|H0 and then added to γ¯norm to
produce the threshold γth required for hypothesis testing. The actual output of
the receiver is
γ˜ = γnorm − γth (4.27)
for each of the satellites that are common to both receivers A and B. If γ˜ > 0
for a particular satellite, it is determined that that particular signal is not being
spoofed. If γ˜ ≤ 0, that channel is marked as being spoofed.
The probability of successfully detecting a spoofing attack is
Pd =
∫ γth
−∞
P (γn|H1) dγn
=
1√
2pi
∫ γth
−∞
exp(−0.5γ2norm)dγnorm (4.28a)
Note that Pd depends on the spoofing detection statistic threshold, which it-
self depends on the the integration time, on the noise variance, and on the signal
carrier-to-noise ratio. The latter quantity varies with time due to environmental
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changes such as satellite elevation. Rather than aiming for a fixed Pd and ad-
justing the integration time to account for variations in carrier-to-noise ratio, a
fixed integration time has been chosen for all signals, regardless of their carrier-
to-noise ratio. For this implementation, a nominal integration time of 2 seconds
has been used. For a C/A code carrier-to-noise ratio of 50 dB-Hz at both the
reference and defended receivers, for a P(Y) power transmission decrement of
Lpsv of 3 dB, for a false alarm probability of 0.01%, and for a 2 second integration
time, Pd is greater than 99.999%.
Although Pd varies for each signal, αfa is always fixed and small, so any
indication of spoofing is a reliable indicator that that signal is being spoofed.
4.6 Results
Several tests have been conducted using this implementation of codeless spoof-
ing detection. For these tests, a receiver located on the roof of a building in
Ithaca, New York (42.44◦ N, 76.48◦ W) was used as the reference receiver, and a
receiver located on the roof of a building in Austin, Texas (30.29◦ N, 97.74◦ W)
was used as the defended receiver.
4.6.1 Determining The Per-Satellite Power Variation
Initial results showed some disagreement between the expected value of the
spoofing test statistic and its actual value, which varied by satellite. It was
theorized that, for some satellites, the difference in power between the trans-
mitted C/A code signal and the transmitted P(Y) code signal varied from the
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3 dB decrement suggested by Ref. [37]. To explore this possibility, data were
collected from both receivers every half hour on February 7, 8, and 12, 2013.
It was assumed that both receivers were free of spoofing during this period
(and indeed, none was detected). It was also assumed that the actual transmis-
sion power decrement Lpsv was exactly 3 dB, and a correction to this value was
solved for. These data were processed using the above algorithms, with γ¯u and
γu calculated over two second accumulation intervals for the length of each data
set, which was nominally 150 seconds. The mean values of γ¯u and γu over the
length of the data set were calculated, and the corrected Lpsv is solved for:
Lpsv = −3 + 10log10
(
1
P
P∑
j=1
E[γuj]
E[γ¯uj]
)
(4.29)
where the −3 in this equation is the assumed difference in transmission power
in dB [37] and P is the number of data sets used in calculating Lpsv for each
satellite. The average was P = 12.2, with the fewest number of data sets being
9 for PRN 29. The resulting Lpsv values are presented in Table 4.1 for every
satellite in the GPS constellation as of February, 2013. Also presented are their
standard deviations.
The smallest power decrement was −2.32 dB for PRN 3, and the largest
power decrement is −2.93 dB for PRN 4. These results also illustrate that the al-
gorithm is operating correctly in the absence of spoofing, as the un-normalized
spoofing detection statistic closely matches the mean value predicted from the
C/A code carrier-to-noise ratio after applying this small correction. Had the cor-
rected Lpsv values been wildly different from−3 dB, one might have questioned
the validity of the analysis on which this entire spoofing detection technique is
based.
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The values presented in Table 4.1 are subject to change for a variety of rea-
sons. These include the addition or removal of satellites into the active GPS con-
stellation, varying P(Y) code transmission power (“flex power” [37]), or switch-
ing between different transmitters on the satellite. These values should be mon-
itored continuously and updated as needed.
4.6.2 Detection of a Spoofing Attack
To test the capability of this system to detect spoofing, a sophisticated GPS
spoofer [4, 5, 45, 46] has been used to conduct a number of attacks in a con-
trolled environment. For each test, the output of the GPS spoofer was combined
electrically with the signal coming from the roof-mounted antenna. This was
done to ensure that no harmful signals were transmitted over the air.
Consider a representative test that was conducted on July 14, 2011, with the
spoofer co-located with the defended receiver in Austin. Fig. 4.3 illustrates this
attack, with a signal that is being spoofed shown in the top panel, and an un-
spoofed signal shown in the bottom panel. For both figures, the normalized
spoofing detection statistic, γnorm is the solid blue line, its expected value γ¯norm
is the dash-dotted green line, and the spoofing detection threshold, γth is the
dashed red line.
During this test, there was no spoofing of any signal for the first 60 seconds,
to establish a baseline for normal operation. At 60 seconds, spoofing of some
of the signals began, but the spoofer transmitted its best estimate of the “true”
signal, though it did not maintain phase coherence with the true signal. For
the spoofer to capture the target receiver, the transmitted power must be larger
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Figure 4.3: Normalized spoofing detection statistic and related quantities for a
spoofed signal (top panel) and an un-spoofed signal (bottom panel) during a
spoofing attack.
than the power received from the satellite. This increase in power has the ef-
fect of reducing the gain in the receiver due to the action of its automatic gain
control. For the spoofed signal, this reduction in gain causes the P(Y) code cross-
correlation to fall. The received C/A code power, on the other hand, rises due to
the increased power of the spoofer. This rise causes γ¯norm and γth to rise. These
two effects combine to cause γnorm to cross below the spoofing detection thresh-
old, triggering an alarm. Thus, even though the spoofer was not “lying” to the
receiver about its location, it was still detected by virtue of its higher C/A code
power level and the lower power level of the P(Y) code.
For the un-spoofed signal shown in the bottom panel, the reduced gain acted
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equally on both the C/A and P(Y) code signal. Thus the cross-correlation detec-
tion statistic’s expected value remained accurate and no spoofing was detected.
Approximately 90 seconds later, at receiver time 150 seconds, the spoofer
began moving the spoofed signal away from the true signal, and the spoofing
detection statistic for the spoofed signal became zero-mean, as would be ex-
pected once the spoofed C/A code drags the defended receiver timing far away
from the true P(Y) code.
The actual spoofing detection output for all signals, γ˜ from Eq. 4.27, during
this same spoofing attack is shown in Fig. 4.4. It is quite clear that PRNs 23 and
30 remained free of spoofing, while all the other signals were spoofed from 60
seconds onward. These results are consistent with the spoofing test parameters.
The probability of successful spoofing detection for all signals during this
spoofing attack is shown in Fig. 4.5. This probability is quite high for most
of the signals for the duration of the test. PRN 30 had a significantly lower
detection probability after the onset of the spoofing attack at 60 seconds. After
this time, the carrier-to-noise ratio of the C/A code for this PRN was quite low,
approximately 38 dB-Hz, which is the cause of this low detection probability.
This “problem” occurs because PRN 30 is not being spoofed, which gives it a
lower carrier-to-noise ratio. Had it been spoofed with a signal strong enough to
drag off the receiver tracking loops, the problem would not have occurred, and
the actual spoofing attack would likely have been detected. The drop in Pd seen
on several signals at approximately 160 seconds is due to a rapid drop in the
carrier-to-noise ratio of those signals, presumably due to the spoofed and true
C/A codes briefly interfering with each other as the spoofer drags the receiver
away from the true signal.
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Figure 4.4: Receiver output for all signals during a spoofing attack.
These results and many similar tests represent the first detections of spoofing
attacks in a real-time system using a single antenna per receiver. This also repre-
sent the first real-time implementation of the cryptographic spoofing detection
technique of Refs. [32, 33, 34, 8].
4.7 Summary and Conclusion
A method for detecting spoofing of the GPS L1 C/A code signal has been im-
plemented in a real-time system. This method assumes that the encrypted P(Y)
code signal is free of spoofing. This assumption allows the use of a “reference
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Figure 4.5: Probability of detection for all signals during a spoofing attack.
receiver” that is free of spoofing to assist in detection of possible spoofing at
a “defended receiver”. If only the C/A code is being spoofed, it is possible to
do a cross-correlation with the portion of the data from the two receivers that
is in quadrature with the C/A code. The code and carrier phase relationship
between the C/A and P(Y) code signals are known, and the portion of the sig-
nal containing the P(Y) code can be isolated and used for cross-correlation. If
there is no spoofing at the defended receiver, this cross-correlation will result in
a large spoofing detection statistic due to the P(Y) code autocorrelation proper-
ties. If the defended receiver is being spoofed, this has the effect of introducing a
code phase offset between the spoofed C/A code and the un-spoofed P(Y) code,
resulting in a small spoofing detection statistic.
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A hypothesis test is constructed to allow determination of a threshold for the
spoofing detection statistic. This threshold guarantees a low probability of false
alarm. For sufficiently strong signals and sufficiently long detection intervals,
the probability of detection is very close to one.
The new method has been tested by subjecting it to realistic spoofing attacks.
Successful detection of these spoofing attacks has been demonstrated. Nominal
receiver response in the absence of spoofing has also been demonstrated in a
number of tests.
As a side benefit of this work, the power differences between the C/A and
P(Y) code signals has been investigated experimentally. The actual differences
in power levels between these two signals can vary by more than a decibel from
the value implied in the system documentation. These power difference calibra-
tions have been used to develop the precise hypothesis test analysis on which
the new spoofing detection method is based.
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PRN Mean (dB) σ (dB) PRN Mean (dB) σ (dB)
1 -2.87 0.04 17 -2.92 0.03
2 -2.92 0.04 18 -2.88 0.05
3 -2.32 0.13 19 -2.83 0.07
4 -2.93 0.05 20 -2.82 0.06
5 -2.92 0.03 21 -2.91 0.08
6 -2.86 0.05 22 -2.91 0.03
7 -2.90 0.06 23 -2.89 0.05
8 -2.90 0.04 24 -2.80 0.08
9 -2.83 0.05 25 -2.88 0.06
10 -2.87 0.06 26 -2.78 0.14
11 -2.89 0.08 27 -2.84 0.05
12 -2.87 0.04 28 -2.61 0.02
13 -2.88 0.04 29 -2.89 0.03
14 -2.89 0.03 30 -2.88 0.05
15 -2.89 0.03 31 -2.89 0.03
16 -2.92 0.03 32 -2.83 0.04
Table 4.1: Observed decrement in transmitted power between L1 C/A and L1
P(Y) signals, by satellite.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A software-defined GPS receiver called CASES was built that implements
several novel signal processing techniques. This receiver has been specially de-
signed to be robust to ionospheric scintillation and to provide measurements
that are useful for the study of ionospheric phenomena. This receiver was im-
plemented on a custom-designed DSP board paired with a narrow-bandwidth
dual-frequency radio front-end. The receiver implements a differencing tech-
nique to remove errors due to oscillator effects, an advanced triggering mecha-
nism to detect the onset of signal scintillation, data bit prediction and wipe-off
for more robust signal tracking, and data buffering to allow observation of the
onset of scintillation. Receiver performance was verified using both real scintil-
lation observed during field campaigns and simulated RF data containing scin-
tillation based on an empirical model.
In the course of using this receiver for ionospheric study, a very subtle fault
was discovered in the carrier phase of the signal transmitted by GPS satellite
SVN 48. The details of this signal fault are shown, along with verification of the
discovery using measurements from a commercial GPS receiver. Several other
satellites of the same design (i.e., GPS Block IIR-M) were investigated and no
similar faults were observed. The implications of this fault were discussed.
A GPS spoofing detection algorithm that makes use of the unknown but pre-
sumably secure GPS P(Y) code was implemented using a version of CASES that
runs on a personal computer. This technique makes use of data collected simul-
taneously from two locations, one of which is assumed to be free of spoofing.
Cross-correlation of the portion of the data from both locations that should con-
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tain the unknown P(Y) code is done, and a hypothesis test is implemented to de-
termine if the result indicates the presence of spoofing. This technique executes
in real time (albeit with a negligible delay) to quickly determine the presence
of spoofing. This technique was tested using RF signal spoofing at one of the
locations, and spoofing was successfully detected. Additionally, previously un-
published decrements in transmitted signal power between the L1 C/A signal
and the L1 P(Y) signals as of 2013 are provided for each satellite.
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